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Transport Costs and the Size Distribution of a
Linearly Arranged System of Cities
Abstract
The question regarding the eﬀects of changing transports costs on the size distribu-
tion of cities is an important topic of systems of cities research. The so-called New
Economic Geography has already given some answers to this question. One central
assumption in this kind of model is a very particular, simpliﬁed spatial structure.
This contribution investigates the consequences of changing transport costs for a
system of cities that are located equidistantly on a straight line. In the case of rising
transport costs, the main outcome of this model is worker concentration in the central
large cities, while the peripheral regions lose residents.
Keywords: transport costs, agglomeration, urban systems
JEL classiﬁcation: F12, R12, R13
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Transportkosten und die Größenverteilung eines
linear angeordneten Städtesystems
Zusammenfassung
Die Auswirkungen von Transportkostenänderungen auf die Größenverteilung von
Städtesystemen ist eine wichtige Forschungsfrage. Im Rahmen der sogenannten Neu-
en Ökonomischen Geographie wurden bereits Antworten gefunden, allerdings nur
für eine sehr spezielle, stark vereinfachte Raumstruktur. Der vorliegende Beitrag
untersucht die Auswirkungen veränderter Transportkosten auf ein System von Städ-
ten, die gleichmäßig auf einer Geraden angeordnet sind. Für den Fall steigender
Transportkosten zeigt sich, dass es zur Bevölkerungskonzentration in den großen,
im Zentrum des Systems gelegenen Städten kommt, während die peripheren Städte
Einwohner verlieren.
Schlagwörter: Transportkosten, Agglomeration, Städtesysteme
JEL-Klassiﬁkation: F12, R12, R13
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1 Introduction
One of the original aims of New Economic Geography is to explain how systems
of cities can arise and change in a landscape that is, apart from economic aspects,
featureless. In chapter 10 of “The Spatial Economy”, Fujita, Krugman and Venables
(1999) modelled the birth of new cities initiated by external population growth,
keeping transport costs constant. In chapter 11 of the same book this modelling
approach is applied to the hierarchical orders of consumer preferences, generating
hierarchical systems of cities. Tabuchi, Thisse and Zeng (2005, further called TTZ)
ﬁrstly analysed the eﬀect of changing costs of the transportation of goods on the
size distribution of a constant population living in a given system of cities. They
expanded Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse’s (2002, further called OTT) model to n
regions with a very simple spatial geometry. Tabuchi/Thisse (2008) examined the
evolution of hierarchical systems of cities in relation to changing transport costs. The
spatial structure of the latter approach is the so-called race-track economy, previously
applied in the multiregional framework of chapter 6 of Fujita et al. (1999).
The aim of this paper is to show how changing transport costs inﬂuence the size
distribution of a non-hierarchical system of cities with a constant total population,
in which the spatial arrangement of the cities allows the eﬀects of heterogeneous
distances to be seen. The modelling approach is closest to that of TTZ, but diﬀers
from the latter in two aspects: Firstly, I assume a spatial structure with not only
one and the same distance between each pair of cities (while TTZ assume only one
distance). Secondly, in my model, urban costs are assumed as one general function
of urban size for all the cities of the system (while TTZ modelled speciﬁc urban
costs functions for each city). These changed basic assumptions mean I interpret
my main results with regard to the relationships between cities that are located
in the centre of the system or at its periphery in terms of a secular time trend
or the long-standing impact of transport costs. In contrast, TTZ interpret their
results referring to phenomena that have little to do with speciﬁc distance aspects
(particularly, urbanisation and suburbanisation). Because of the simplicity of the
spatial structure of their model, TTZ could solve their model analytically. The model
presented here is solvable only by means of numerical simulations.
My main ﬁndings are: If the elements of a system of cities are arranged equidistantly
on a straight line, changing transport costs have diﬀerent eﬀects on cities that are
closer to the geographical centre of the system than on cities that are located further
away, near the ‘ends’ of the system. For example, in the case of rising costs of the
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transportation of goods, the mobile population will concentrate in cities around
the centre of the system, withdrawing from peripheral locations. Again, falling
transportation costs enable the production of goods by skilled labour in remote areas,
amplifying the population spread to all regions of the system including peripheral
ones. The model has been applied to, amongst others, the increased costs of freight
transportation in the Russian Federation as a consequence of the price liberalisation
after 1991, since the prices of energy (and hence of transportation services) have
multiplied in real terms.1
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the framework of the general
equilibrium model for n regions based on OTT. Section 3 derives equilibrium prices,
quantities, wages and indirect utilities. Section 4 presents spatial equilibria resulting
from migration processes, which equalise utility diﬀerentials between cities. Section
5 is the paper’s conclusion.
2 Basic assumptions
The spatial arrangement of the n regions in consideration is shown in ﬁg. 1. Each of
them contains one monocentric city with a central business district (CBD), marked
by the points in ﬁg. 1. The distance between the CBDs of two adjacent cities is
assumed to be one.
1 2 m 2m − 2 2m − 1
Figure 1: Linear and equidistant formation of n = 2m − 1 cities
In addition to the TTZ model, this model is based on the “alternative” approach
to modelling agglomeration and trade developed by Ottaviano et al. (2002) for two
regions, enhanced for urban costs (the OTT model). The factors of production and
sectors (or goods, resp.) are characterized by the assumptions of that model.2
There are two goods and two factors of production. The factors of production are
denoted as A and L. They are assumed to be constant. The A-workers have no
qualiﬁcations. They are immobile and equally distributed in the space between the
1 See Kauﬀmann (2010). Another reason for increasing transport costs over a longer time period
could be the shortage of energy resources as a consequence of diminishing supply factors or rising
demand (see, e.g., Bräuninger et al., 2005).
2 The reader will ﬁnd a detailed explanation of the OTT model in Kauﬀmann’s 2010 work.
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cities. They produce the homogenous A-good under constant returns to scale. The
transport of the A-good is costless, it is produced and sold under the conditions of
perfect competition. The value of one unit of the A-good equals the marginal costs
of its production. The A-good is the numéraire of the model. The L-workers are
highly qualiﬁed, they can choose their preferred location in one of the n cities and
each of them will migrate if there is any city where the realized indirect utility is
higher than in the city where he (or she) actually lives. The L-good is heterogeneous;
its production shows increasing returns to scale. It is produced and sold under
conditions of monopolistic competition. The transport of the L-good causes costs of
τ units of the numéraire per unit of itself and of distance. This leads to the matrix
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n − 2 n − 3 ... m − 2 ... 0 1














which is a n × n-Toeplitz-matrix.
The portion of qualiﬁed workers living in a speciﬁc city of the entire population of
qualiﬁed workers is represented by the vector λ. Each variety of the heterogeneous
product is produced by a ﬁrm that employs φ L-workers. The product is supplied in
all cities and in the “agricultural” space between them. There are N = L
φ ﬁrms. The
variable costs generated by the production of the L-good are assumed to be zero.
Every worker has the quasilinear quadratic utility function


















where q(x) represents the consumed quantities of the heterogeneous good in a
continuous space of varieties reaching from 0 to N, q0 is the consumed quantity
of the numéraire, and α, β and γ are positive parameters. If β > γ the consumer
prefers the whole bundle of varieties (love-for-variety).
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The L-workers live in cities that form symmetrically around the CBD with a city
radius of length 2 ×
λi
2n. They commute to their working places in the CBD. Urban
costs are generated as the sum of costs for using urban space and commuting costs.3
The same urban cost function Θ(λi) is assumed for all cities,
Θ(0) = 0, Θ(1) < ∞, Θ
0(λi) ≥ 0. λi ∈ [0,1] (3)
The budget of every L-worker living in city i is restricted, consequently, to
Z N
0
p(x)q(x)dx + q0 = wi + ¯ q0 − Θ(λi), (4)
wherein ¯ q0 represents the initial endowment as a quantity of the numéraire. Solving
the optimisation task, we get a linear demand function for variety x
q(x) = a − bp(x) + c
Z N
0




β + (N − 1)γ
, b =
1
β + (N − 1)γ
, c =
γ
(β − γ)(β + (N − 1)γ)
. (6)




















+ ¯ q0 +wi −Θ(λi).
(7)
Every city has its own “agricultural” hinterland (where the population of A-workers
lives) symmetrically around its line space. A city together with its hinterland is
deﬁned as a “region”.
3 Determination of equilibrium
The next task is to describe the state of equilibrium of the model. To ﬁnd the
equilibrium prices, we have to determine the derivative of the proﬁt function of a
3 For further assumptions see Ottaviano et al. (2002) p. 430.
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representative ﬁrm and set it at zero. The operative proﬁt Π of a ﬁrm residing in










with distance δij ∈ ∆, pij (resp. qij) the price (resp. quantity) of a variety of the
heterogeneous good produced in region i and consumed in region j. The price index
for region i is







If we replace the demand for one variety in the region of its production qii in the














qii = a − (b + cN)pii + cPi (11)
we get the equilibrium price p∗ of a variety of the homogeneous good both produced
























4 Similarly to Chamberlain’s 1933 monopolistic competition model each ﬁrm takes the price index
Pi as given. Accordingly, the derivative of the ﬁrm demand with respect to the mill price,
dqii
dpii, is
−(b + cN). This also applies to the derivatives of the demand functions of this ﬁrm from other
regions.
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a + cPj + (b + cN)δijτ
2(b + cN)
∀ j 6= i. (15)











a + cPi + (b + cN)δijτ
2(b + cN)
. (17)









































In equilibrium, we get a regional price “landscape”. That these diﬀerent regional
prices cannot be balanced by arbitrage is shown in the appendix. Eq. (20) tells us
that half of the transport costs are born by ﬁrms, and half by consumers.
Our next issue is to show the condition that ensures that the heterogeneous good is
allocated to all regions, in other words, that the price of none of the varieties of the
L-good reaches its prohibitive limit, or
5 All vectors are assumed as columns; row vectors are transposed column vectors (e.g., λT).















In the case of an increase of the freight transport rate τ, the demand for varieties
from other regions declines; however, because of the inﬂuence of substitution for
other varieties on demand, it may rise, too. This result may seem implausible at
ﬁrst glance, but, looking at the distance matrix ∆ we ﬁnd that, particularly for
adjacent columns (j −1,j) far from the central column m, the λ-weighted sum of δj
may exceed one (λTδj > δij). In these cases raising transport costs will strengthen
the trade between adjacent regions at the periphery of the system while weakening
the exchange of goods between centre and peripheral regions. Conversely, declining
transport costs will promote trade relations between central and peripheral regions
at the expense of trade between neighbouring regions.
The inﬁmum of (for two regions i and j, at least) prohibitive freight transport rates,
suppressing trade between these regions to zero, is denoted by τTrade. Analogous to




















(2b + cN)δij − cNλTδj
. (23)
Because of the symmetry of the spatial arrangement, ∆ is a symmetric matrix.
Therefore, in spatial equilibrium, every distribution λ should be symmetric, too.
Looking at eq. (1), we quickly can see that, for symmetric λ,
λ
Tδ1 = λ
Tδn = m − 1 (24)
6 See appendix.
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2 )(n − 1)
. (25)
The inﬂuence of parameters c and N on the maximum value that the freight trans-
portation rate might have, so that the supply of the heterogeneous good is ensured in
all regions, indicates that interregional trade could be regarded as a precondition for
product diﬀerentiation and preference for variety. The relationship between τTrade and
the spatial extension of the urban system refers to the fact that low transport costs
are a precondition for the evolution of large urban systems. Increasing transport
costs may bring into question the continuation of human settlements in peripheral
regions.
To determine the quantities in equilibrium, we put the equilibrium price p∗
ii and the
price index Pi from eq. (19) and (18), respectively, into the demand function eq.




ii = (b + cN)p
∗
ii (26)
Analogously, the substitution of p∗
ij and Pj in eq. (14) leads to
q
∗
ij = (b + cN)(p
∗
ij − δijτ) (27)
for the quantity of the heterogeneous good produced in city i and sold in a diﬀerent
region j.
It is implied by assumption that the operational proﬁts are completely distributed
to the L-workers employed in the ﬁrms. This leads to
7 More generally, one can see that for symmetric λ with (λi<j = 0,λi>n−j+1 = 0) the relationship
λTδj<m = λTδn−j+1 = m − j also holds.
8 In Kauﬀmann (2010) instead of eq. (25) only the weaker result τTrade > 2a
(2b+cN)δ1n is found.
Further results in Kauﬀmann (2010) are not attenuated.
9 See appendix.











































without any possibility for simpliﬁcation because it contains the whole vector λ. To
determine spatial equilibria, ﬁrstly we can replace
R N
0 p(x)dx in the indirect utility
function eq. (7) with Npji.10 Following this, we introduce eq. (29) into the indirect
utility function, and replace the prices with the appropriate formulas.11
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2 − (2b + cN)aτλ




















+ ¯ q0 − Θ(λi). (30)
10 This substitution is as a result of the assumption of symmetry of the heterogeneous good: all
varieties have the same parameters, α, β, and γ, and hence the same price at one location.
11 See appendix.
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As long as the indirect utilities (or real wages, respectively) are diﬀerent in some
regions, some L-workers will have an incentive to migrate to places where their
individual utility is higher. Due to the complexity of the problem we cannot show
the result of the process of adjustment to equilibrium analytically. Instead, we derive
possible equilibria for speciﬁc parameter values by means of numerical simulation.
This is the topic of the next section.
4 Migration and spatial equilibrium
It is assumed that L-workers possess complete information about the indirect utility
attainable in all cities for the present time and that their choice of a region to live in
is determined by utility diﬀerentials exclusively and independently from each other.
Furthermore, we assume that migration is costless. Every skilled worker is looking
for a city where he or she can realise higher utility than in the city where he or she






            
            
1 Pn
k=1 Vk(Vi − Vj) if λi > 0, λj > 0
min{0, 1 Pn
k=1 Vk(Vi − Vj)} if λi > 0, λj = 0
max{0, 1 Pn
k=1 Vk(Vi − Vj)} if λi = 0, λj > 0
0 if λi = 0, λj = 0.
(31)
The system is in spatial equilibrium if the indirect utility prevailing in all inhabited
cities (λ > 0) is equalised,
V (λ) − ¯ V ≤ 0. (32)
Regions that cannot reach the common utility level ¯ V lose any production of the
heterogeneous good, their portion of the L-workforce is zero.
Because of its complexity, eq. (32) cannot be solved analytically. This paper presents
some solutions by means of numerical simulations. For this, ﬁrstly, the parameter
values for a, b, c, N, L and A in eq. (30) are ﬁxed.12 Secondly, an assumption
12 For comparability of results the same parameter values as Tabuchi et al. (2005) are used: a = 9,
b = 1, c = 1, φ = 1, L = 100 und A = 1200, see p. 435 footnote 12. N results from L
φ.
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regarding the size of the system, n = 2m − 1, has to be met. Thirdly, an initial
distribution λ0 is deﬁned. This can be symmetric (for example, uniform, λm = 1
or λ1 = λn = 1
2) or asymmetric (for example, λm−i < λm+i ∀i < m or λi6=m = 1 or
λ1 = λn−1 = 1
2). Fourthly, linearising eq. (3) to Θ(λi) = θλi, we ﬁx the parameter
θ > 0. Finally, an ordered set of freight transport rates τ, 0 ≤ τ ≤ τTrade is ﬁxed.
Starting at zero, for each τ ∈ τ the same loop is run: Beginning with λ0, utilities








∀i = 1,...,n. (33)
Furthermore, migration is restricted by the identity
n X
i=1
∆λi ≡ 0. (34)
The loop will end if the equilibrium condition eq. (32), now
V (λ) − ¯ V ≤ ζ (35)
is fulﬁlled (the value of the positive threshold ζ has to be small).13 The equilibrium
vectors λ can be plotted against the freight transport rates τ. Fig. 2 shows the
development of an urban system containing seven cities for θ = 100, the ζ-criterion
is 0.001.
Looking at ﬁgs. 2–4 on p. 16–17, we consider ﬁrstly the case τ = 0: Here the
adjustment process always leads to a uniform distribution of λ. Eq. (30) shows λ in
all additive terms on the right side only connected with τ; only those constants that
are the same for all regions less the urban cost function θλi remain. This means, if
the population in a city increases, then the utility in this city will decline, and the
migration process will lead the system to a stable equilibrium.
If the transport costs increase slightly, utility declines faster in peripheral regions
than in the centre of the system. Hence, some L-workers will move from peripheral
cities towards more central regions. The urban costs still stop all the skilled workers
from gathering in city m though. In equilibrium, the utility is the same in all cities as
13 In practice, in run k the routine sets λi to zero if the sum of ∆λi and λi (from run k − 1)
undercuts zero. The loop is stopped if max(|V 1T
n − 1nV T|) < ζ.
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Transport Costs and the Size Distribution of 7 Cities
Figure 2: Size relationships in a system of seven cities for diﬀerent freight transporta-
tion rates

























Transport Costs and the Size Distribution of 3 Cities
Figure 3: Size relationships in a system of three cities for diﬀerent freight transporta-
tion rates
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long as the smallest city still has a population. If the transport costs rise even further,
then initially the cities at the fringes of the system will lose their last inhabitants.
However, the space between cities is populated by the A-workers, who are immobile.
In principle, if transport costs rise, the modelled spatial arrangement leads to spatial
concentration if the transport costs are not too large, the urban costs are not too
small, and the system is big. In small systems the results are very similar to TTZ:
because the geography is small, the urban costs drive some L-workers out of the
centre cities (see ﬁg. 3). In large systems, the inﬂuence of distance outweighs the
eﬀects of urban costs: peripheral cities are rapidly depleted, and there is no dispersion
in the case of large transport costs (see ﬁg. 4).






























Transport Costs and the Size Distribution of 21 Cities
Figure 4: Size relationships in a system of 21 cities for diﬀerent freight transportation
rates
The impact of urban costs is analysed by varying the urban cost parameter θ for
ﬁxed τ > 0. Fig. 5 shows the size relationships in a system of ﬁve cities. For θ = 0
the migration to city m is unrestricted, any positive transport costs lead to all the
L-workers congregating in the central city. This also holds for very small urban costs.
The threshold value of θ when some L-workers migrate from city m depends on the
values of the other parameters, particularly n and τ. The higher the urban costs,
the narrower the limits for urban agglomerations. Urban costs create dispersion.
As long as θ > 0 and 0 < τ < τTrade, the central city m will be the largest city of the
system. That means, λm > λi6=m for positive freight transport rates holds for large
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Effects of Urban Costs on a System of 5 Cities, t t=0.03
Figure 5: Spatial equilibria at diﬀerent urban costs




























Distribution of Urban Population in the central cities of Systems of 2m−1 Cities, t t=0.51*t tTrade
Figure 6: Impact of n on central agglomerations
18 IWH Discussion Paper 26/2010IWH
n, too. Fig. 6 shows this for urban systems from 11 cities to 101 cities (m = 51): In
a large system of cities the central cities are more dispersed, but this doesn’t negate
the inhomogeneity of the size distribution. This depends on urban costs: For large
urban costs, the distribution of a large system of cities trends to uniformity.
5 Conclusions
The main result of the numeric simulation is the relationship between transport
costs and spatial concentration: As long as the so-called “no-black-hole” condition,
τ < τTrade, is fulﬁlled (this is one central assumption in New Economic Geography)
and urban costs are not too high (or n is not very small), the population of a linearly
arranged system of cities concentrates in central and large cities if transport costs
rise.14 Vice versa, declining freight transport costs improve the quality of life in
peripheral regions.
The modelled spatial structure should be regarded as a complement to the star-
shaped structure in TTZ. That model yields similar results for developed societies
that have reached a stage of transport technology that allows the formation of urban
systems with large metropolitan areas. However, the TTZ model is based on diﬀerent
assumptions to those of this model, the two sets of results must be interpreted
with this in mind. While TTZ analyses the interplay between urban costs (that are
assumed as speciﬁed functions of the size of cities particularly for each city) and
transport costs (that do not have any reference to geographical heterogeneity), the
model presented here refers to geography (whereby the metric scaled distance is
transformed to an ordinal scaled arrangement) but doesn’t consider urban costs as
diﬀerent functions of city size. The TTZ model explains suburbanisation as one
possible consequence of the secular declining trend of transport costs in compact,
cross-linked spaces. Our model shows the possible outcome of changes in transport
costs for cities that are connected by one long transportation line (a river, railway
line, or road).
Generally, we should be careful when interpreting the results yielded by highly
abstract spatial models with regard to their spatial structure. In modelling systems
of cities the assumption of a line shaped structure is more relevant for big countries
with sparsely populated regions. Our results predict the withdrawal of skilled
production from peripheral to central regions as the result of rising freight transport
14 This stands in accordance with the empirical results of Kauﬀmann (2010) for Russia.
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costs (or, respectively, a push to the periphery in the case of freight transport
becoming cheaper), since geography matters. This could be relevant for the evolution
of settlement patterns, particularly in some former socialist countries where transport
costs, together with energy costs, have jumped after price liberalisation.
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Appendix
Derivation of eq. (22)
Replacing Pj with N
Pn
i=1 λipij and pij with eq. (20) in eq. (14), we get


























































































































5.1 Are there incentives for arbitrage?
As stated in the text, the equilibrium prices of the heterogeneous good speciﬁed in
eq. (19) and (20) cannot be equalised by means of arbitrage, the proof for this is as
follows.
There should be no incentive for somebody to buy one unit of an L-good in city
j to sell it for proﬁt in region i, for example. This is the case if, for all i 6= j, the
non-arbitrage-condition
pjj + δijτ − pji > 0
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holds. In our model the following is found:

























Is it the case that, for any given distribution λ, the relationship δij ≥ λT(δi − δj) is
always valid? Because
P
i λi = 1, resp. λT(δi − δj) ≤ max(δi − δj) it is suﬃcient to
show the validity of δij ≥ δki − δkj ∀ k for j > i (because ∆ is symmetric).





















































δij = j − i ∀ j > i,
we’ll get
δki − δkj = |k − i| − |k − j|.
We have to distinguish between three cases:
1. k ≤ i < j : |k − i| − |k − j| = i − k − j + k = i − j = −δij (< δij),
2. i ≤ k < j : |k − i| − |k − j| = k − i − j + k = 2k − i − j (see below),
3. i < j ≤ k : |k − i| − |k − j| = k − i − k + j = j − i (= δij).
15 See eq. (1).
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In the second case we ﬁnd
2k − i − j
?







commensurately to the presupposition of case 2, k < j, hence |k − i| − |k − j| < δij,







T(δj − δi)] > 0,
this means that the no-arbitrage condition is satisﬁed. Price diﬀerentials cannot
be equalised by arbitrage. This also holds for the case where some quantity of the
heterogeneous good that is produced in a third city k is purchased in region i to sell
in region j.
Determination of quantities in equilibrium
Putting p∗
ii (eq. 19) and Pi (eq. 18) into eq. (11), we get
q
∗































= (b + cN)p
∗
ii.
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This is eq. (26). Eq. (27) is analogously found by replacing p∗
ij and Pj in eq. (14)
with eq. (15) and eq. (18, with i for j and vice versa), respectively:
q
∗





























a(2b + cN) − b{a + [cNλTδj + δij(2b + cN)]τ




a(b + cN) + cNλTδj
τ
2(b + cN) − bδij
τ





a(b + cN) + cNλTδj
τ



















= (b + cN)(p
∗
ij − δijτ).
Determination of the indirect utility
The replacement of
R N






















+ ¯ q0 + wi − Θ(λi).
Next, we substitute pji with the equilibrium price from eq. (20):































+ ¯ q0 + wi − Θ(λi).














































+ ¯ q0 − Θ(λi).
























































+ ¯ q0 − Θ(λi).
Replacing the sums with vectors and matrices yields eq. (30).
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